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Identities in Migrant Cinema:
The Aesthetics of European Integration
Jalene Betts
Identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps, instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished
historical fact, which the new cinematic discourses then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a “production”
which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation.1
Stuart Hall, 1996
I. Introduction

A

lthough much progress was made in Europe over the last half
century with regard to the integration of markets and the near-vaporization of national borders, recent years show that, contrary to the
illusion of an “enlightened” continent free from the racism of the past,
ethnicity continues to play a role in European culture. As demonstrated
by disputes in the Balkan region over Kosovo’s independence, debates
on the acceptance of new member states into the European Union (in
particular Turkey’s application for admittance), and growing concerns
over immigration in the Netherlands and France, ethnicity seems to
prove itself as a thing of the present, not the past. Media coverage of
the “problems” of Islam—unemployed “Arab” youths roaming the
streets, young girls forced to wear head-coverings by their “sexist”
relatives—is a reality, whether or not the claims made by such representations are valid.
In recent years, many scholars have debated about the effects of
globalization on the so-called “European identity.” These debates are
not limited to academia; everyone seems to have an opinion. While
some academics such as Ulrich Beck promote a more benevolent, cosmopolitan vision of Europe, there has also been the development of
right-wing nationalist movements arguing against the admission of
foreigners into their countries. Right-wing nationalist movements in
both France, under Jean-Marie Le Pen, and the Netherlands, under Pim
Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, have targeted North African immigration
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as a major cause of many problems in their respective countries. It is in
some ways surprising that these sentiments have arisen in these two
countries, as the Netherlands was until recently known for its highly
tolerant nature while France is famous for the ideals of the French Revolution, liberté, égalité, et fraternité, and consequently as a terre d’accueil,
or “land of welcome.”
In both France and the Netherlands, the film industry is involved in
the representation of ethnic identities from the North African diaspora.
Post-migrant2 is the description I use to represent films of this genre,
meaning films focusing on the lives of first- and second-generation
North African immigrants in Europe. They are sometimes, but not
always, written or directed by people of the corresponding heritage.
In France, the beur cinéma movement has gained force since its debut
in the 1980s in both the number of films focusing on the lives of people
of North African extraction in France and in the number of directors of North African origin producing the films. In the Netherlands,
political and social leaders like Geert Wilders and Theo van Gogh have
used film to promote their views on immigration, while other directors
contribute to the new mocro movie movement. The notion of a European identity and the surrounding debate are thus important not only
in terms of cohesion between different European nation-states and
between the European Union and its neighbors, but also within the different member nations themselves. The definition of European identity
is a contested, important issue.
Why has this dialogue concerning European identities erupted with
more vigor in recent years? Why have both political leaders and immigrants chosen film as a medium of expression for their opinions? What
identities are being represented and by whom? This essay is the culmination of my research while studying at the University of Paris-Saint
Denis during the autumn of 2007 in France and Maastricht University
in the Netherlands during spring of 2008. It will thus explore the following two research questions: In this age of multiculturalism, how
are European national cinemas redefining our understanding of European national identities, and what common aspects transcend separate
national cinemas to support a “European” identity in post-migrant
cinema?
The essay is divided into three major parts. The first section focuses
on research conducted during the fall semester in Paris, France. Here
I introduce the universalistic notions in the French national identity,
sketch the history of North African immigration to France, discuss

28

Jalene Betts

the rise of beur cinema, and explore notions of identity in these films.
Part two gives attention to the research conducted during the spring
semester in Maastricht, the Netherlands. It touches lightly upon the
history of North African immigration to the Netherlands, underlines
the importance of the current debate about the Dutch national identity,
reveals the nuances of the recent rise of the mocro movie movement,
and elaborates on certain notions of Dutch-Moroccan identity in mocro
films. The conclusion then addresses these issues in relation to globalization.
II. Paris: The City of Lights, Camera, and Action
A. Universalistic Notions in French Identity
France is a country that proudly embraces its contributions to the ideals of the European Enlightenment. Since the French Revolution in the
18th century, “France has prided itself on being the land of equality,
founded on an abstract concept of universal citizenship which renders
ethnic, gendered, religious or class difference irrelevant.”3 This notion
of “universal citizenship” is related to that of global citizenship promoted by the Macalester College Institute for Global Citizenship in that
both ideals are meant to be open to anyone and everyone. That is to
say, neither concept presupposes who is able to be a citizen based upon
racial, sexual, or cultural differences. However, while global citizenship advocates the idea of being a citizen of the world or cosmopolitan,
the notion of universal citizenship advanced by the French Revolution
was intended to promote the idea that anyone throughout the world
who so desired could be a French citizen, as long as he4 adhered to the
principles of the Republic.5
However, recent years increasingly put into question France’s ability or even desire to uphold the principle of universal citizenship. This
is demonstrated particularly during the last third of the 20th century
in relation to Arab immigrants in France. The growth of racism and
conflicting nationality laws in 1970s French society exacerbated ethnic
tensions, increasing the hostile climate toward immigrants and their
descendents.6 In the last few decades, French academics and the media
have used the term la deuxième génération, or “second generation,”
to denote people of Maghrebi descent whose parents immigrated to
France. More recently, use of la troisième génération, “third generation,”
continues to foster the notion that these people who, like their par-
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ents before them, were born and raised in France, are still not French.
Thus, even the terminology used by the French discourse on identity
perpetuates the racial notion of French identity, rather than the more
universalistic one that the Republic likes to think it supports.
In Reframing Difference: Beur and Banlieue Filmmaking in France, Carrie Tarr contributes to this debate about multi-ethnicity in France and
the consequent transformation of the French identity by exploring the
role of filmmaking in the promotion of voices from marginalized communities. Essentially, she argues that through the fostering of identity
voiced by the ethnic “Other,” beur films encourage the development of
a counter-discourse that allows for new ways of conceptualizing difference.7 The end of this section of the essay will explore her work on beur
cinema in France, while the next main section will discuss the case of
mocro cinema in the Netherlands.
B. A History of Non-Integration
France’s aforementioned “universalistic” notions of identity and its
reputation as a land of welcome based on the principles of liberté,
égalité, et fraternité have significantly deteriorated in the last half century, undermined by the country’s treatment of North African immigrants following the Second World War.8 The history of immigration
to France was generally one of integration, despite occasional tensions
between immigrants and nationals over employment and housing.9
This was the case with the many Italian, Polish, and Spanish immigrants that entered the country in the latter half of the 19th century and
the early part of the 20th century.10 However, according to Benjamin
Stora, these groups of immigrants succeeded while immigrants from
the Maghreb did not—due in large part to the legacy of French colonialism in North Africa.11
According to Karina Slimani-Direche, in neither French nor Algerian
literature on immigration is there a distinction made between Arab
and Berber immigrants.12 Yet this distinction is important to make,
as it explains the further augmentation of ethnic tensions between
immigrants and French nationals. Historically, Berbers from the Kabyle region in Algeria, the Republic’s most important colony,13 were the
first immigrants to enter France for temporary work in industrial factories. Overpopulation and an insufficient traditional economy in Kabyle
meant that young, unemployed males were eager to leave the region
and find work to support themselves and their families. Consequently,
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these travailleurs coloniaux represented three-quarters of immigrants
in 1934, and over half in 1950.14 Furthermore, Berbers throughout the
Maghreb were an ethnic minority discriminated against in many ways.
For example, in Algeria, Arabs were given certain rights that would,
depending on the French government of the time, fluctuate between
a near equality with white European settlers (considered French citizens) and lower levels of French tolerance, but the Berbers were nearly
always persecuted and never considered citizens. This could only negatively impact their social standing in the context of the flood of immigrants to France.
As registered earlier, immigrants from the Maghreb initially came
to France to perform manual labor on farms in the countryside and in
industrial factories in urban areas. According to Marie-Claude BlancChaléard, in the period known as Les Trente Glorieuses or the “Thirty
Glorious Years” of immigration (between 1945 and 1975), many hundreds of thousands of manual workers came from North Africa to
France to earn a living for their families, whom they initially left at
home in their countries of origin. At the outset, these workers were
a welcome relief to the French economy and society, which had suffered severely during World War II. However, the oil embargo of 1973
and the consequent oil crisis had a major impact on the lives of both
immigrants and nationals. Post-1974, France was overcome by a wave
of xenophobia due to the pressures of unemployment and housing.
Immigrants were viewed as a problem, and new policies prevented
potential immigrants from legally entering the country. Also during
this period la regroupement familial, or family reunification, began. Families of immigrants working in France were brought to the country
and housed on the outskirts, or banlieues, of major cities. Furthermore,
France’s colonial history in North Africa and the war over Algerian
independence left a strain of deeply entrenched racism against “Arabs”
among many French people.15
In recent media coverage of society and politics, the animus is demonstrated by the rise of the extreme right-wing Front National, set
up in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen. According to a BBC profile report
from 2002, Le Pen contends that the message about immigration that
he promoted thirty years ago is still relevant today. He is quoted as
saying, “Massive immigration has only just begun. It is the biggest
problem facing France, Europe and probably the world. We risk being
submerged.”16 More recent still is the never-ending series of affaires
de foulard, in which Muslim girls insist on their right to wear Islamic
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headscarves in France’s schools. These well-publicized controversies
have called into question the relationship between France’s secular
institutions and citizens’ religious and cultural rights. Carrie Tarr notes
further that, “The wearing of the hijab is seen as so threatening to the
Republican principles of universalism and laicity, as well as to the freedom of women, that in February 2004 the national assembly voted to
ban such symbols in school rather than encourage tolerance for signs
of difference.”17 Thus, at least in this case, France chose to hide signs of
difference in an attempt to smother the potentially threatening identities that went along with them, rather than cultivate tolerance and
promote the aspects of those identities that adhered to the principles
of the Republic.
In Mémoires d’Immigrés, author and director Yamina Benguigui
explores the mysterious phenomenon that characterized first-generation immigrants from North Africa throughout France: their absolute
silence about their experiences, both in France and in the Maghreb. In
particular, she emphasizes how the second generation, better educated
and raised in France, is not only unwilling to perform the same manual labor as their parents, but also unwilling to continue their ritual
silence.18 Tarr concludes that the repressive political and social climate
after 1974 forced beurs to organize—to develop associations aimed at
combating racism and intolerance.19 It was in this climate in the 1980s
that beur filmmakers first began to produce films that dealt with the
problems of integration in France.
C. The Rise of Beur Cinema
It is essential to first define and discuss the significance of two French
terms in relation to this essay: beur and banlieue. The term beur comes
from the Parisian inverse-slang (verlan) form of the word “Arab.” It stereotypically refers to a young, usually unemployed, second-generation
male (beurette for female) of North African descent who lives or grew
up in the banlieues (suburban ghettos) surrounding Paris. It is important to note that, in contrast to suburbs in the United States, French
suburbs did not develop as a refuge for middle or upper class citizens
who wished to escape the hustle and bustle of urban life. Rather, they
often began as bidonvilles, or shantytowns, originally built to house foreign migrant workers, effectively separating and isolating them from
the French upper classes living in the city itself.20 Thus began the tendency to marginalize immigrants by pushing them to the periphery—
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not only of the city itself, but also of the minds of French nationals for
whom the immigrants were insignificant manual laborers. During and
after decolonization, beurs increasingly became the most stigmatized
ethnic minority in France, due in large part to both their high visibility
and the legacy of decolonization.21
Historically, the representation of characters of North African
descent in French films followed one of two representational schemas:
either they were the “bad guys” (the drug dealers, prostitutes, pursesnatchers), or they were victims peripheral to the central character. In
either case, Carrie Tarr claims that in these films they, “are the objects
of, and contained within, a white eurocentric gaze and discourse
which…‘takes for granted and “normalizes” the hierarchical power
relations generated by colonialism and imperialism, without necessarily even thematizing those issues directly [sic]’.”22 She argues further
that French cinema gravitated toward the marginalization, if not outright silencing, of “troubling postcolonial others”23 until the comparatively recent development of the beur cinema movement, begun in the
early 1980s. During this time, beur directors and authors independently
started producing small-scale works. These low-budget works, often
autobiographically inspired, focused on the identity crises and socioeconomic difficulties experienced by second-generation immigrants.24
The first full-length feature film, widely recognized as the official beginning of the beur cinema movement, was Le thé au harem
d’Archimède, written and directed by Mehdi Charef. This 1985 film,
based on Charef’s book, follows the story of Madjid, the son of Algerian immigrants, and his français de souche (ethnic French) friend Pat as
they roam the streets of Paris and its banlieues. Having just completed
high school, they search for employment. However, there are an endless number of obstacles that stand in their way. One such barrier is the
thinly veiled racism of employers, which results in Madjid’s rejection
most of the time. The French ideal of equal opportunity seems not to
apply to him. Even when he does finally manage to find an employer
who is willing to hire him, he runs into a second hurdle that he cannot
find a way around: his Algerian nationality. Although raised in France
his entire life, Madjid does not possess French citizenship papers.
While the most obvious answer would seem to be for him to apply for
French citizenship, he is prevented from doing so by his mother, who
wants him to remain Algerian and not disgrace the family. Meanwhile,
Madjid is pressured to find a way to make money because his father
cannot work. Pat, on the other hand, fails at finding a job mostly due
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to his own laziness and lack of effort. Thus, the two boys resort to various sorts of delinquency: trafficking prostitutes, pick-pocketing in the
metro system, and stealing cars.
In his dreary and dismal depiction of the world of the Parisian banlieues, Charef seems to criticize French society for its indifference to the
difficulty of people’s lives on the margins of society. Yet at the same
time, Charef does not allow his characters (neither beur nor French) to
simply become victims of the society that they live in. All characters in
the film face difficult situations that they choose to deal with in different ways. The problem seems to be that no matter what they choose,
whether it be on the right side of the law or not, they cannot manage
to escape the realities of banlieue life. The French ideal of freedom is
an illusive dream that morphs slowly into a nightmare. Rather than
having the freedom and ability to make the “right” choices and work
upward out of despair, the characters are slowly sucked into a downward-spiraling free fall no matter what choices they make. They are set
“free” by society, pushed to the edges, released and forgotten, abandoned and let drop to the bottom.
In the end, Madjid, Pat, and their friends steal a car and drive to the
ocean in an attempt to escape from the inevitability of life in the banlieues. The police soon catch up with them, however. Unlike his friends
who all flee (including Pat), Madjid seems to come to the conclusion
that he is fighting a fruitless battle. He allows himself to be arrested.
However, the last shot of the film shows Pat waiting at the side of the
road for the police car, holding his thumb out like a hitchhiker and
waiting for them to pick him up, too. He is unwilling to lose the sense
of brotherhood he cultivated through his friendship with Madjid. It is
more important than freedom, uniting them even in their despair and
giving them a sense of hope.
Le thé au harem d’Archimède is a very good example of beur cinema25 for many reasons. The fact that the screenplay was written and
directed by a man of North African origin (specifically Algerian) demonstrates the first steps of self-representation taken by beur directors.
The film incorporates the theme of problematic identity in beur culture,
posing questions as to whether the nature of identity is inherently
innate or something you choose. Other common themes in beur cinema
are family, friendship, immigration, unemployment, and delinquency.
Most importantly, this particular film incorporates the emergence of
identity in beur cinema as not only problematic, but also fluid.26 Charef
challenges the one-dimensional French stereotypes of beurs as either
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criminals or victims, allowing for the development of a deeper comprehension of the subject’s identity. The complexity and mastery of the
work is that it shows how a single subject’s identity can be made up of
multiple identities, held together despite their seemingly contradictory
nature.
While the importance of beur filmmaking lies in its shift away from
the specific gaze employed by the majority when looking at the situation of immigrants, and thus provides a new perspective from the
immigrant’s point of view, there is a major critique of beur filmmaking related to both this perspective and to identity. The fact that this
new perspective is labeled as beur filmmaking itself threatens to lock
these writers, directors, and performers into roles that produce a sort
of typecasting and type-directing. In other words, rather than allowing for varied, constantly changing identities, these actors become
entrenched in the discourse of films about socioeconomic difference
and ethnicity.27 This critique is voiced by director Karim Dridi expressing his concern about the attempt to enclose a certain cinematic genre
within specific boundaries and rules, which he believes would be dangerous for cinema itself.28 Indeed, his words allude to the threat of new
cinematic territories where the work of directors and actors cannot
cross borders freely—a reversion back to xenophobic restriction policies rather than freedom.
III. Maastricht: The Netherlands’ Muse29
A. North African Immigration to the Netherlands
As with France, decolonization played a major role in migration to
the Netherlands. According to Dr. Marlou Schrover from the Universiteit Leiden, the circumstances favoring migration during the period
between the 1950s and 1980s in the Netherlands were somewhat similar
to those of France and its former colonies. Schrover highlights how in
both Surinam and Indonesia factors including both Dutch citizenship
and a Dutch education enabled immigrants from these former colonies
to migrate easily to the Netherlands.30 In addition, prior to its recognition of Indonesia’s independence, the Netherlands went through a
bloody military intervention in an attempt to preserve the country as a
colony. In the end, this affected the opinions of the Dutch populace on
migrants from Indonesia and immigration to the Netherlands in general. Furthermore, the long-term consequences of immigration to the
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Netherlands included terrorist attacks committed by Moluccan youth
in the mid-1970s as a reaction to their environment of isolation caused
by the policies of the Dutch government at that time.31
Although many of the problems of decolonization experienced by
the French were similar to those of the Dutch, the history of North
African immigration to the Netherlands is not as prominent as that to
France. This is because the Dutch did not colonize North Africa. Thus,
North African immigration to the Netherlands was primarily economic
and based on labor needs rather than an effect of decolonization.32
Jean-Claude Chesnais, head of the Social Economics Department at
the Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris, estimates the number
of foreign workers in the Netherlands originally from countries in the
Maghreb in 1975 as follows (in thousands): Algeria: 0; Morocco: 28;
Tunisia: 1; Maghreb: 9; and Turkey: 38. France had the following figures (in thousands): Algeria: 420; Morocco: 165; Tunisia: 90; Maghreb:
675; and Turkey: 35.33 Here, it becomes obvious how many more immigrants from the Maghreb settled in France than in the Netherlands
during the Trente Glorieuses, the thirty-year period after 1945 in which
Europe, and especially France, received many foreign workers from
North Africa.
More recently, Ayman Zohry cites Moroccans as the largest North
African nationality among the migrants in Europe, represented at fiftysix percent. In addition, nearly fifty percent of these migrants are concentrated in France, while the rest are dispersed throughout Germany,
the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, and Italy. As France’s former
colony and its most important partner in immigration, Algerians are
the second largest North African population in Europe at thirty-one
percent, ninety percent of whom are in France. Tunisians rank third
at slightly over thirteen percent of the North African population in
Europe, with seventy-five percent living in France and fifteen percent
in Italy.34
Like many other researchers, Zohry does not mention the Netherlands when describing migrant population figures in Europe. This is
most likely due to the smaller number of North African migrants in the
Netherlands when compared to countries such as France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and Spain. However, this does not mean that North
African immigration (and immigration in general) to the Netherlands
did not have a significant impact on the country. A second factor may
explain the traditional neglect of researchers to pay attention to North
African immigration in the Netherlands. It is the fact that the immigra-
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tion generally happened later, with migrants moving through other
receiving countries first (such as France), before moving to the Netherlands, thus affecting the Dutch awareness and opinions of immigration
later than in other countries.
Unlike France, where labor migration from Morocco and Tunisia
was regulated in the early 1960s, labor migration from Morocco was
not officially regulated by the Dutch government until 1969, with the
regulation of Tunisia following in 1970.35 Family reunification also happened later in the Netherlands than in France; families of guest workers
were brought to the Netherlands in the 1980s. High youth unemployment was one of the major concerns of this time period. As mentioned
above, internal migration of North African immigrants between European states was made easier by the Schengen agreement in 1985, in
which France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg
dissolved migration restrictions within their interior borders.36
According to Chavi Keeney Nana of the Migration Policy Institute, integration of immigrants into Dutch society did not become a
major political issue until the rise of Pim Fortuyn’s Lijst (LPF) party in
2002.37 Originally immigration policies in the Netherlands followed
a relatively multicultural approach, aiming to involve immigrants in
Dutch society while at the same time recognizing and accepting their
differences.38 The notion of verzuiling, or “pillarization,” that dominated Dutch society for a significant portion of the 20th century was
intended to promote a multicultural society. Essentially, the idea was
that each religious or social group would have its own political party,
trade unions, schools, broadcasting stations, newspapers, and other
associations, enabling plural societies to function independently in the
same country without deep mixing. This appeared to work with the
demographic make-up of the Netherlands that dominated during the
previous time period,39 which was a predominantly Christian society,
with the separation of Protestants and Catholics, socialists and liberals.
It was not as successful, however, when applied to the case of Muslim
immigrants, both those from Indonesia and those from North Africa.
In response to the growing diversity in the Netherlands (made
apparent not only by higher numbers of minority populations but
also by media representations of the effects of globalization in the
Netherlands and in other countries), Dutch concerns have multiplied
over topics ranging from the economy and job markets, to education,
to terrorism. This is shown markedly by the support Pim Fortuyn’s
party received for its policies on the suspension of new immigration
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to the Netherlands and, in contrast to the previous pluralist notions of
society, the integration of immigrants into “Dutch” society.40 Following the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan
Muslim extremist, the fear of Muslim minority youth radicalization in
the Netherlands drove Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Minister of Immigration Rita Verdonk to set up a roundtable discussion on
minority participation in Dutch society, the Broad Initiative for Social
Cohesion. According to Keeney Nana, “While the number of actual
Islamic extremists is small…its support base is perceived to be large,
fueled in part by the poor socio-economic standing of minority groups,
discrimination, and their outsider status in the mainstream Dutch society.”41 In response to this initiative, a large number of social organizations expanded their efforts to involve minorities in Dutch society,
focusing particularly on the development of youth leadership through
education and employment. Two concepts in particular emphasized
interaction and involvement between marginalized groups and the
mainstream population: “bonding” and “citizenship.”42 This debate
essentially centers on the notion of what constitutes Dutch identity.
B. The Recent Discovery of a “Dutch” National Identity
As the nation that legalized same-sex marriage, abortion, euthanasia, prostitution, and marijuana use, the Netherlands was traditionally
viewed as a country that would tolerate almost anything. Over the
years, the Dutch tendency for finding compromises between opponents through a seemingly endless form of negotiation has become
known as the poldermodel. This propensity for compromise and agreeing to meet halfway manifested itself in the pluralistic tradition of
socio-political pillarization that the Dutch cultivated from the late
1800s to the 1960s. As previously mentioned, society was divided by
denominations: Catholics, Protestants, and to a lesser extent, Socialists and Liberals. According to Wiebe Nauta of Maastricht University, pillarization was aimed at combining group-based autonomy with
consultation and compromise at the elite level.43 Despite this intense
segregation, these different segments of Dutch society coexisted peacefully for many years. While pillarization’s importance decreased with
the country’s increasing secularization and individualization from the
1960s onward, the institutional legacies of this system are still seen in
the Netherlands today.44
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In the context of globalization, the Netherlands is experiencing
many societal changes similar to those in the rest of Western Europe.
The flood of immigration from North Africa in the last few decades has
put pressure on the society’s ability to cope with racial, ethnic, and religious differences as people compete for educational and employment
opportunities. Furthermore, columnist Molly Moore of the Washington Post conveys the notion that this situation is exacerbated by worries over terrorism, the infiltration of organized crime into the (legal)
prostitution and drug trade, and Holland’s image as “an international
tourist destination for drugs and sexual debauchery.”45 She cites James
Kennedy, Professor of Contemporary History at the Free University
of Amsterdam, who contends that, “There is an uneasiness about globalization that the Dutch don’t have control over their own country
anymore.”46 Thus, globalization is pressuring the Netherlands in ways
that compel its citizens to question their perceptions of Dutch identity
in relation to external forces and opinions. In other words, the nation is
struggling to redefine its core values.
As noted earlier, the current political discourse in the Netherlands
has shifted from a multicultural stance on the integration of Muslims toward a tougher, more one-sided assimilatory approach.47 The
immense support for immigrant integration policies that do not tolerate different cultures or religions (particularly Islam) is evidenced
in the rapid rise to political power of Pim Fortuyn, an anti-immigration, anti-Muslim politician who sharply criticized what he called “the
Islamic dilution of Dutch values.”48 His murder just before the 2002
election by an Animal Rights activist, as well as that of the prominent
film director Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan fundamentalist two
years later, have been cited repeatedly in debates on these topics. In
Murder in Amsterdam, Ian Buruma explores the cases of Pim Fortuyn
and Theo van Gogh in relation to these issues and comes to one conclusion that touches on the importance of youth and alludes to the identity crisis of second- and third-generation immigrants:
Tolerance, then, has its limits even for Dutch progressives. It is easy to
be tolerant of those who are much like ourselves, whom we feel we can
trust instinctively, whose jokes we understand, who share our sense of
irony…It is much harder to extend the same principle to strangers in our
midst, who find our ways as disturbing as we do theirs, who watch fearfully as their own children, caught in between, slip from the paternal grasp into
a new and bewildering world [my emphasis].49
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In general, it is accepted that the increasing presence of Islam in
Europe today is a result of immigration. However, views differ on
the nature of Muslim identities in Europe and their relationship to
“European” secular modes of thinking. The adherence to the “Clash of
Civilizations” theory between Islam and Western Europe is the most
basic point of divergence, with academics such as Jytte Klausen, Ian
Buruma, and Amartya Sen on one side, and on the other the adherents
favoring Pim Fortuyn’s anti-Muslim notions, namely, Rita Verdonk,
Geert Wilders, and Jean-Marie Le Pen.
C. Mocro Movies: Bang or Bust?
Unlike beur cinema in France, mocro cinema only developed in the
last decade in the Netherlands. The word “mocro” is Dutch slang for
“Moroccan” and appears to have been first used to refer to specific
films in 2005. While the historical use of the term isn’t as developed
and discussed as the French term beur, mocro would be the most accurate translation of the term into Dutch. Following the success of native
Dutch director Albert ter Heerdt’s Shouf Shouf Habibi! (Hush Hush
Baby!) in 2004, Karin Wolfs explored issues of mocro authorship in an
article for the Dutch film magazine, Film Krant. Similar to the French
film industry, Dutch films in the past represented North Africans in
only minor roles, as either criminals or victims. According to Wolfs,
ter Heerdt emphasized how, in the past, films about immigration were
referred to as “box-office poison” by both directors and producers
alike.50 Like beur cinema, the development of mocro films seemed to
somewhat coincide with the Dutch struggle over identity, perhaps as
a reaction to growing tensions around immigration and xenophobia.
This is evidenced by the fact that it closely followed the rise to power
of nationalist parties such as Pim Fortuyn’s Lijst. However, there are
two distinct differences between these two film genres.
First, unlike Mehdi Charef’s Le thé au harem d’Archimède and other
more serious films realized nearly twenty years earlier, Shouf Shouf
Habibi! is a light-hearted comedy that plays on the stereotypes and
idiosyncrasies of both the native Dutch and Moroccan immigrant families.51 A second significant difference concerns the question of mocro
authorship. For the most part, the directors are all native Dutch whose
families have lived in the Netherlands for generations. Even the most
involved ethnically North African individuals in the Dutch film industry have not yet directed a film or written a screenplay without the
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contribution of native Dutch directors and writers. This is the case even
with Mimoun Oaïssa, who co-wrote Shouf Shouf Habibi! with Albert ter
Heerdt, contributed additional dialogue to Martin Koolhoven’s 2005
release Het Schnitzelparadijs, and performed lead roles in both of the
previously mentioned films as well as ter Heerdt’s 2007 release Kicks,
but has not yet had the opportunity to write a screenplay or direct a
film on his own.52 Despite these differences, both beur and mocro cinema tend to focus, on the one hand, on the stereotypes and “otherness”
of North Africans in Europe, and on the other hand, on the problems
and successes of integration.
After the success of Shouf Shouf Habibi! demonstrated the profitability of comedies about Moroccan-Dutch relations, interest in making
mocro films skyrocketed.53 Yet there is still a distinct absence of DutchMoroccan or Dutch-Turkish directors, screenwriters, and producers in
Dutch cinema. One straightforward answer to this puzzle might be the
problem of scale. According to David Deprez of the Maastricht Lumière
Cinema, there is a near-total lack of multicultural aspects in Dutch cinema because the production scene is so small. There is only one Film
Commission giving funds to filmmakers. Fehd el Ouali believes this
should not be a major cause for concern for the reason that a Moroccan
screenwriter or director would be more familiar with Moroccan idiosyncrasies, gestures, or expressions.54 However, Mimoun Oaïssa warns
against such generalizations by claiming that there is no Moroccan
community in the Netherlands, only the Dutch community.55 Yet this
might be beside the point. The emphasis here should be on the ability
of Moroccan-Dutch individuals to develop identities that fit who they
are, without being restricted to stereotypical subject positions created
by the dominant discourse on Dutch identity. As seen in France, even
with second-generation North African screenwriters and directors, it is
still difficult for actors and writers to escape typecasting and essentialist labeling of film genres. With the lack of Moroccan directors, screenwriters, and producers in the Netherlands, it will be that much harder
for Dutch-Moroccan immigrants to break out of the stereotypes.
Albert ter Heerdt’s Shouf Shouf Habibi! demonstrates the continual
and unfazed use of stereotypes in Dutch cinema. Mimoun Oaïssa plays
the protagonist, Ap, who expresses his disgust at the idea of having to
live in Morocco (filmed as a land of desert without cities or trees), and
relief that his father and mother moved to the Netherlands. The plot
revolves around the escapades of Ap’s family, varying from his mother’s comedic attempts to seek revenge on his father for mistreating her;
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his sister Liela’s continual rejections of marriage proposals and secret
relationship with a native Dutch actor; his younger brother taking
pictures of Muslim girls with their headscarves off at school and blackmailing them for money to not show their fathers; his older brother’s
affair with a fellow policewoman; and his friends’ plans to rob a bank.
Meanwhile, Ap himself struggles to search for a job—but not too hard.
He falls asleep waiting for his interview, expresses ridiculous expectations at the local job center, believing that they will call Steven Spielberg to offer him a role in a film, and, when he finally does have the job
he claims to have dreamed of, he arrives an hour late on his first day,
having forgotten about daylight savings time. To top it off, Ap sneaks
out of his own wedding after realizing the commitment it will take.
Mimoun’s character in Shouf Shouf Habibi! differs significantly from
Madjid in Le thé au harem d’Archimède, particularly in the treatment of
his unemployed status. Ap is not seen as victimized at all. Though he
spends the entire film searching for a job, even when he gets one he is
portrayed as completely incompetent and lazy, thus losing it again in
the end. At most, the message the film manages to convey is that this
kid just wants to hang out with his friends at the bar and play pool—
and marry a lusty Moroccan virgin. In Het Schnitzelparadijs, the main
character appears to have the same issue with laziness; he has a good
education, is intelligent, and his father wants him to be a doctor, yet he
chooses instead to wash dishes in the local hotel kitchen. Thus, these
films emphasize that stereotypical Moroccan laziness is what prevents
these Moroccan youths from finding good employment, rather than
raising questions of racism or identity.
In regard to the production of mocro films, Mimoun Oaïssa points to
four states of improvement with regard to immigrants’ image. In the
first stage, no “foreigners” are seen onscreen. Foreigners are present
in the second stage, but they are seen only by “white eyes” and given
cliché roles. Stage three represents a deepening of those clichés as in
Shouf Shouf Habibi!. In the final stage, immigrants are approached as
people.56 Unfortunately, this formula for the integration of immigrants
into film culture in the Netherlands is oversimplified. While the first
three stages seem relatively clear-cut and realistic, the jump between
the third and fourth stages is not. Oaïssa does not go into detail about
how a deepening of stereotypes in films leads to the ultimate rejection
of those stereotypes. In fact, this seems to be the exact opposite of the
beur cinema movement ideal of fluid identity, focusing rather on the
fixing and deepening of identity stereotypes. The Dutch film industry
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will have to come to terms with this issue if it wants to successfully
promote the integration of immigrants into Dutch society.
IV. Conclusion
In studying migrant film in both France and the Netherlands, I learned
several lessons related to culture, identity, and the phenomenon of
globalization. First, at the base level, is the difficulty and importance
of raising issues no one talks about. The beur cinema movement in
France has received attention from critics since its début in the 1980s.
Mocro movies, in comparison, have received very little academic attention either inside the Netherlands or outside the country. Although the
Dutch cannot be blamed for this lack, given the relative youth of this
kind of cinema in their country as compared to France, the point is that
the current absence of any such research makes it very difficult to break
ground and move forward with a concise analysis. Yet this should not
deter researchers at any level from looking at these phenomena. It is
important to get the discussion started. Expertise will mature as the
fruits of research weather critique and ripen into knowledge.
This leads to the second point, namely, the importance of the immigration debate in Europe. Within the last half-century, all levels of society felt the impact of the dramatic increase in immigration from North
Africa to Europe. Critics of immigration cite Samuel Huntington’s
“Clash of Civilizations” thesis when they claim that this immigration,
originally dominated by Muslim manoeuvres (manual laborers) and
their families, is detrimental to European society and values. Many
Europeans feel threatened by Islamist extremism and socioeconomic
worries about employment. However, the rising trend of nationalism
and Islamophobia is matched by a reactionary “re-Islamization” of
second-generation immigrants as well as a push for multicultural tolerance.
Thus, a third lesson shows how, in this climate of uncertainty, the
metamorphosis of identity is a delicate issue in which film has several
roles to play. The representation and portrayal of ethnic identity are
important, but only to a certain extent. Individuals in both France and
the Netherlands want to be recognized as talented actors and directors, not just spokespersons for their ethnic communities. Films enable
directors to present their versions of reality, but in order to have the
freedom to do this, they must not be tied down to specific “cultural”
themes. Actress Maryam Hassouni puts her feelings plainly: “I am
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Dutch. With Moroccan parents.” Though she has a Moroccan heritage,
she sees herself as Dutch and feels she shouldn’t be limited by other
peoples’ perceptions of her. She expresses her pleasure at the potential
of playing a Dutch girl. Even more radically, her dream role is to play a
Ninja: “Fatima by day, Ninja by night.”57 For Hassouni, then, films provide an outlet for personal expression. For now, she is content to play
Muslim roles, but she doesn’t want to do it continuously.58 Karim Dridi
expresses similar sentiments when critiquing the French film industry
notions of beur, banlieue, and cinéma sociale, refusing to have his work
put in a box or analyzed from only one point of view.59
Although some of these films make a more serious attempt to show
the world “the way it is” and promote a certain view of identity, it is
important to retain the ability to view these films with a critical eye
from all angles. This is essential to our ability to constantly redefine
our identities. According to Michael Featherstone, cultural representations facilitated by the film industry work to bridge public and private
life, connecting people across time and space, and reshaping existing
cultural signifiers to fit a new discourse of cultural identity.60
Viewing the current climate of globalization as a confrontation
between different religious and cultural divisions is a mistake. It
ignores life’s complexity, reducing human identity to a few, oversimplified adjectives, such as “Muslim” or “French,” and disregarding
the many other ways in which people perceive themselves. In Identity
and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, Amartya Sen explores notions of
identity, developing the idea that human beings can belong to various
groups simultaneously without contradicting themselves.61 Through
our ability to reason, we are able to discern within particular contexts
the relative importance of these multifarious loyalties. Furthermore, in
saying that “Nationalism does not simply ‘express’ a preexistent identity: it ‘constitutes’ a new one,” Michael Ignatieff alludes to the power
that discourse and context can have on the construction of identity.62
In this light, do post-migrant film movements in Europe promote a
new “alternative language” by which all Europeans can come to terms
with their so-called “differences” and forge a new definition of European identity? This can only be so if identities are allowed to remain a
process, rather than a fixed entity. Labeling specific subject positions
as concrete identities only allows for the reproduction of stereotypes,
not for the creation of new identities. Both French and Dutch films
risk falling into the trap of reproducing cultural stereotypes. However,
while the development of the beur cinema movement seems to work
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toward expanding modes of representation, mocro films seem only to
reproduce these stereotypes. The key to the Dutch ability to change
this trend may lie in the promotion of directors, producers, and screenwriters of North African origin who can free themselves from the current Dutch discourse on mocro film that promotes the reproduction of
stereotypes. Furthermore, a healthy public discourse on this subject is
needed to sustain such a venture.
Stuart Hall, in the epigraph at the beginning of this essay, makes a
very clear point that ties in well with this discussion. Identity is constructed, therefore it is a continual process constituted within representation, not outside it. Cinema should not be seen “as a mirror held up
to reflect what already exists, but as that form of representation which
is able to constitute us as new kinds of subjects, and thereby enable us
to discover who we are.”63 Film allows for new forms of representation
and the creation of new identities. Thus, films enable the expression
of hybrid identities based on their fluidity more than on connections
to ethnicity or nationality. Perhaps this is the most important lesson:
In the era of globalization, identities are best constituted through the
conscious effort of exposing them to new contexts and improving
them through the process of critical adaptation,64 which assesses and
rewrites both old and new identities. Films at once allow exposure to
new conceptions of identity and an outlet for the expression of individual identities. The growth of the global media industry has increased
the availability of new forms of identity expression while connecting
the adherents to specific identities throughout the world. 
•
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Filmography
Year Title. (Director: Nationality) Country
1985 Le thé au harem d’Archimède (Mehdi Charef: French from Algeria) France
1988 De bruit et de fureur (Jean-Claude Brisseau: French) France
1995 Bye-bye (Karim Dridi: French from Tunisia) France
La Haine (Mathieu Kassowitz: French) France
Pigalle (Karim Dridi: French from Tunisia) France
1997 L’autre côté de la mer (Dominique Cabrera: French from Algeria) France
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1998 Mémoires d’immigrés (Yamina Benguigui: French from Algeria) France
2000 Drôle de Félix (Olivier Ducastel and Jacques Martineau: French) France
2001 Inch’Allah dimanche (Yamina Benguigui: French from Algeria) France
Samia (Philippe Faucon: French) France
2002 Wesh wesh, qu’est-ce qui se passe? (Rabah Ameur-Zaïmèche: French from Algeria)
France
2003 L’esquive (Abdellatif Kechiche: French from Tunisia) France
2004 Shouf shouf habibi! (Albert ter Heerdt: Dutch) the Netherlands
Submission: Part 1 (Theo van Gogh: Dutch) the Netherlands
Cool! (Theo van Gogh: Dutch) the Netherlands
2005 Het schnitzelparadijs (Martin Koolhoven: Dutch) the Netherlands
2006 Ghetto Girls Documentary (Lamia Abbassi, Samira Ahli, Chafina Ben Dahman and
Mina Ouaouirst: all Dutch from Morocco) the Netherlands
2007 La graine et le mulet (Abdellatif Kechiche: French from Tunisia) France
Kicks (Albert ter Heerdt: Dutch) the Netherlands.
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